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Abstract
A generalized user-revenue model is proposed in which the volatility risk of
quasi short-run prots and equity capital e¤ects reecting the risk of bearing
the costs of nancial distress are taken into consideration. This is achieved
by extending the conjectural user-revenue model proposed by Homma and
Souma (2005). Specically, uncertainties are added to endogenous holding-
revenue and holding-cost rates, and the utility function of nancial rms is
formulated in terms of both quasi short-run prots and equity capital. The
conjectural user-revenue price is extended as a generalized user-revenue price,
and the extended generalized-Lerner index is proposed to incorporate these
extensions.
JEL classication: C61; D24; G20; L10
Keywords: Equity capital; Risk adjustment; Conjectural user-revenue model;
Generalized user-revenue price; Extended generalized-Lerner index
1 Introduction
This paper introduces a generalized user-revenue model (GURM) that ac-
counts for both the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots and equity capi-
tal e¤ects reecting the risk of bearing the costs of nancial distress. This is
achieved through the application of concepts in the consumption-based cap-
ital asset pricing model (CCAPM)1 to the conjectural user-revenue model
(CURM) proposed by Homma and Souma (2005).
The CURM is a general extension of Hancocks (1985, 1987, 1991) user-
cost model (UCM) of nancial rms.2 The extensions included in the CURM
relax the strictness of the three assumptions of the UCM: (i) that the nancial
rm under analysis is risk-neutral, (ii) that there exists no strategic interde-
pendence between nancial rms, and (iii) that there exists symmetry related
to information in the nancial asset and liability markets. In reality, these
assumptions are seldom fullled, and if even one of these assumptions is not
met, the estimation of user-cost prices (UCPs) derived under the UCM will
be biased.
The UCP is dened based on holding revenues or the costs of nancial
goods, and the sign of the UCP is a useful criterion for unambiguous classi-
cation of nancial goods as inputs or outputs. It is widely recognized that
the UCP provides an objective criterion based on microeconomics, in con-
trast to conventional classications based on a priori assumptions. To make
the most use of the UCP under more general assumptions, the CURM derives
stochastic user-revenue prices (SURPs) and conjectural user-revenue prices
(CURPs) as generalizations of the UCP. The SURP extends the conventional
1See, for example, Cochrane (2005, pp.5-35) for a full account of the CCAPM. The
important point to note is that the CCAPM is an equilibrium model, whereas the GURM
does not aggregate individual bank behavior.
2As mentioned in Homma and Souma (2005), Homma et al. (1996) were the rst to
apply the UCM to the Japanese banking industry, and they estimated a stochastic prot
frontier function and an X-prot function for panel data during the High Growth Era.
O¯mori and Nakajima (2000) estimated total factor productivity and economies of scope
in the Japanese banking industry using data from 1987 to 1995. Other papers applied
this approach to measure the value of nancial services in the national income accounts
(Fixler and Zieschang, 1991, 1992). Nagano (2001) measured the nominal value of nancial
services in Japan using this approach.
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UCP to be applicable to the case of nancial rms that are not risk-neutral,3
and the CURP extends applicability to the cases of nancial rms that follow
strategic interdependence and nancial assets and liabilities-related market
information that exhibits asymmetrical characteristics. The relationship be-
tween the SURP and CURP is used in the CURM to generalize the Lerner
index of monopoly power to the oligopoly of nancial rms under dynamic
uncertainty.4 The generalized Lerner index (GLI) is a Lerner index that
reects these extensions of the UCP to the SURP and CURP.
The CURM is thus a more general model that relaxes the criticality of
the three assumptions of the UCM. However, there are several other im-
plicit assumptions in the UCM that are not considered in the CURM. The
most important of these implicit assumptions are that holding revenues and
holding costs are certain and that the utility function of nancial rms is
independent of equity capital. The former assumption ignores the existence
of uncertainties in actual holding revenues and holding costs, and the latter
disregards the e¤ects of nancial distress costs. Financial distress costs are
incurred when the nancial rm is expected to experience di¢ culty in hon-
oring its commitment, and thus include the cost of bankruptcy and the loss
3As mentioned in Homma and Souma (2005), Barnett and Zhou (1994) and Barnett et
al. (1995) were the rst to analyze the user-cost approach under dynamic uncertainty. This
is likely to lead to generalizations similar to the analysis of the SURP. Unfortunately, their
purpose is the pursuit of more desirable monetary aggregation, and thus not only did they
not derive a generalized user-cost price, such as the SURP, but also they did not consider
the case in which nancial rms are strategically interdependent and in which there are
informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the formulation of
the dynamic-uncertainty model in their papers is less rigorous in terms of the stochastic
properties of the exogenous state variables, as compared to the present paper.
4As reported in Homma and Souma (2005), other approaches that estimate rst-order
conditions for prot-maximizing oligopolies have been used to measure the degree of com-
petition and collusion in Japanese nancial industries. Souma and Tsutsui (2005) exam-
ined the change in the level of competition in the Japanese life insurance industry for the
period form 1986 to 2002 using the asset approach and found that the industry was not
very competitive, but that the industry became more competitive starting from 1995, when
the New Insurance Industry Law came into e¤ect. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) applied an
asset approach, similar to that of Souma and Tsutsui (2005), to the Japanese banking
industry and estimated the degree of competition from 1974 to 2000. They found that the
market had become more competitive in the 1970s, and judged that the Japanese banking
sector faced perfect competition by the middle of the 1990s. Using the H-statistic, Tsut-
sui and Kamesaka (2005) found that the Japanese securities industry was in monopoly
equilibrium in the 1980s and in monopolistic competition equilibrium in the 1990s.
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in rm value. An increase in equity capital reduces the risk of the burden of
nancial distress costs. Financial distress costs and risk reduction by raising
equity capital are thus important concerns for nancial rms that conduct
deposits with institutions such as banks.
In the present paper, the CURM is further extended by incorporating
the fundamental premises of the CCAPM. The extension involves two parts:
1) the introduction of uncertainties into endogenous holding-revenue rates
(EHRRs) and endogenous holding-cost rates (EHCRs) with corresponding
denitions for stochastic endogenous holding-revenue rates (SEHRRs) and
stochastic endogenous holding-cost rates (SEHCRs), and 2) the formulation
of the utility function of nancial rms in terms of both quasi short-run
prots and equity capital. The introduction of uncertainty e¤ectively adds
risk-adjustment e¤ects to the CURM as expressions of the covariance of un-
certain factors in the SEHRR or the SEHCR given a stochastic discount
factor. This modication makes it possible to consider the volatility risk of
quasi short-run prots explicitly. The new formulation of the utility function
introduces equity capital e¤ects into the CURM by allowing the marginal
rate of substitution between equity capital and quasi short-run prots to be
expressed. This extension e¤ectively incorporates indirect consideration of
the risk of bearing the cost of nancial distress in addition to subjective eval-
uation of equity capital by nancial rms and the opportunity cost of equity
capital. Consideration of these risks is thus incorporated into the SURP, the
CURP, and the GLI determined by the extended CURM.
The extended CURM is derived here from the principles of the CCAPM
as the generalized user-revenue model (GURM). Denitions for the extended
SURP, the CURP, and the GLI are also derived from the GURM in consid-
eration of more general assumptions. The extended SURP and CURP are
generically called the generalized user-revenue price (GURP), and the ex-
tended GLI is referred to as the extended generalized-Lerner index (EGLI).
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals
with the introduction of uncertainties into the EHRR and the EHCR, and the
denition of the SEHRR and SEHCR. The utility function of nancial rms is
also reformulated as a function of quasi short-run prots and equity capital.
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In Section 3, the decision of nancial rms is formulated as a stochastic
dynamic program, and stochastic Euler equations are transformed into a
formulation that expresses risk corrections clearly. The GURP is derived,
capital e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects are dened, and the relationship
between the GURP and the CURP is claried. The EGLI is then derived
based on this relationship, and the relationship between the EGLI and the
GLI is claried. The paper is concluded in Section 4.
2 Introduction of Uncertainties and Inclusion
of Equity Capital
In this section, the assumptions of the CURM concerning the certainty of the
EHRR and the EHCR and the independence of the utility function of nan-
cial rms from equity capital are relaxed by the introduction of uncertainty
into the EHRR and the EHCR and the inclusion of both quasi short-run
prots and equity capital in the utility function of nancial rms. These
changes appropriately take into account the uncertainties in actual holding
revenues or costs, which drive the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots,
and the necessity of nancial rms to consider an increase in equity capital
as a means of reducing the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs.
The derivations in this section are based on three preliminary assump-
tions. (i) Time is divided into discrete periods. (ii) These periods are suf-
ciently short, so that variations in exogenous (state) variables within the
period can be neglected. That is, exogenous variables are constant within
each period but can change discretely at the boundaries between periods.
(iii) The process of adjustment is essentially instantaneous, allowing stock
adjustment problems to be ignored. These assumptions are made in order
to facilitate future empirical research, similar to Hancock (1985, 1987, 1991)
and Homma and Souma (2005), in the expectation that the GURM may
provide a consistent basis for such research.
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2.1 Stochastic Endogenous Holding-Revenue Rates and
Holding-Cost Rates
The net cash ow produced by a nancial good, that is, a nancial asset
or liability, is dened in the same way as in the CURM. Similar to the
UCM and the CURM, it is assumed that all nancial transactions occur at
the boundaries between given unit periods of time. Each nancial rm holds
stocks of nancial assets and liabilities as inventory, and the costs or revenues
that accrue from the holding of these inventories are components of the net
cash ow of services to the rm. These costs or revenues are regarded to be
of equal or higher importance than the costs of real resource inputs such as
labor, materials, equipment, and facility-related inputs in kind.
The general price index, pG;t, is adopted as a deator for all nancial
goods at the beginning of period t. The real balance of the j-th nancial
good of the i-th rm at the beginning of period t is expressed as qi;j;t, and
the revenue obtained (or cost required) from holdings per currency unit for
a single time period is expressed as the holding-revenue rate (or holding-
cost rate) hi;j;t+1 at the end of period t (and thus at the beginning of period
t+1). In this case, it is assumed that the holding-revenue rate (or holding-cost
rate) is contracted at the beginning of period t and the uncertainty therein
is realized at the end of period t. Thus, hi;j;t+1  qi;j;t is the holding revenue
or cost, which is received or paid at the end of period t. Financial assets and
liabilities are divided into j = 1;   ; NA assets and j = NA+1;   ; NA+NL
liabilities.
Denition 1 During period t, the net cash ow of the i-th rm produced by
nancial good j, denoted by qNCFi;j;t , is dened as
qNCFi;j;t = bj  (hi;j;t  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1 + pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t) ; (1)
where bj is the parameter used to distinguish between nancial assets and
liabilities: bj = 1 for assets (i.e., j = 1;   ; NA), and bj =  1 for liabilities
(i.e., j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL).
For example, for an asset such as a loan (with the exception of cash),
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bj = 1, in which case the rst term of the right-hand side of Eq. (1), hi;j;t 
pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1, indicates holding revenues, and the last two terms, pG;t 1 
qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t, represent the change in the nominal asset for the period.
If loan repayments by the borrower exceed the total new loans for the period,
the revised balance indicates a positive change, and if the repayments are
lower than the total new loans for the period, the value is negative. These
three terms thus express the net cash ow resulting from the acceptance of
an asset. However, cash, which is an asset, generates no interest. As such,
the holding revenue for cash, even if held, is zero. Similarly, in the case
of a liability such as a deposit, bj =  1, the rst term of the right-hand
side,  hi;j;t  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1, indicates holding costs, while the last two terms,
pG;tqi;j;t pG;t 1qi;j;t 1, represent the nominal liability change. Therefore, the
change is positive if new deposits exceed withdrawn deposits and is negative
if new deposits are less than withdrawn deposits. These three terms thus
indicate the net cash ow resulting from the issuance of a liability.
To account for the strategic interdependence between nancial rms and
asymmetry in nancial asset and liability market information, holding-revenue
rates and holding-cost rates are assumed to be determined endogenously, as
in the basic CURM. In the GURM, however, uncertainties in actual holding
revenues and holding costs, the drivers of volatility risk for quasi short-run
prots, are also considered. Such uncertainty is attributable to unpredictable
factors such as uncollected or unpaid interest rates, future service charge
rates, capital gains or losses, default rates, and insurance premium rates.
The uncertainty in these factors gives rise to volatility in quasi short-run
prots. The EHRR and the EHCR with uncertainty correspond to the sto-
chastic representations SEHRR and SEHCR.
Let ri;j;t be the collected interest rate of the j-th asset of the i-th -
nancial rm in period t. Then, rQi;j;t, h
S
i;j;t, h
C
i;j;t, h
D
i;j;t, and h
R
i;j;t are the
certain or predictable components of the uncollected interest rate, the ser-
vice charge rate, capital gains or losses, the default rate, and the SEHRR
(hRi;j;t = ri;j;t + r
Q
i;j;t + h
S
i;j;t + h
C
i;j;t   hDi;j;t). Let Qj;t be the total assets in the
market,  i;j;t+1 be the sum of the uncertain or unpredictable components of
rQi;j;t, h
S
i;j;t, h
C
i;j;t, and  hDi;j;t. Furthermore, let zki;j;t (k = R;Q; S;D) be the
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vectors of exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting each endogenous component
of the SEHRR, and let zHi;j;t =

zR0i;j;t; z
Q0
i;j;t; z
S0
i;j;t; h
C
i;j;t; z
D0
i;j;t
0
be the vectors of
exogenous (state) variables of the SEHRR except  i;j;t+1, where h
C
i;j;t is as-
sumed to be exogenous similar to the case of the CURM. For tractability of
analysis, it is also assumed that hRi;j;t and  i;j;t+1 are separable. The SEHRR,
hi;j;t+1, can then be dened as follows.
Denition 2 The stochastic endogenous holding-revenue rate of the j-th -
nancial good of the i-th rm at the end of period t, denoted by hi;j;t+1, is
dened as
hi;j;t+1 = bC  hRi;j;t +  i;j;t+1
= bC 

ri;j;t + r
Q
i;j;t + h
S
i;j;t + h
C
i;j;t   hDi;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
= bC 
h
ri;j
 
Qj;t; z
R
i;j;t

+ rQi;j

Qj;t; z
Q
i;j;t

+ hSi;j
 
Qj;t; z
S
i;j;t

+ hCi;j;t
 hDi;j
 
Qj;t; z
D
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
= bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
= hi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t;  i;j;t+1

; j = 1;   ; NA, (2)
where bC is the parameter used to distinguish cash from other nancial assets.
That is, if qi;j;t represents cash (i.e., j = 1), then bC = 0, whereas if the
nancial good is another type of nancial asset (i.e., j 6= 1), then bC = 1.
The case of bC = 0 gives hi;1;t+1 =  i;1;t+1, where  i;1;t+1 is the rate
of uncertain withdrawal claims, and other uncertain mobile payments and
the component are deemed to be cash. Uncertain withdrawal claims and
other uncertain mobile payments are the response risk to liquidity. Thus,
 i;1;t+1 < 0 if  i;1;t+1 predominantly reects the response risk to liquidity,
and  i;1;t+1 > 0 if  i;1;t+1 mainly reects the component deemed to be cash.
The di¤erence between the SEHRR and the EHRR in the CURM is the
incorporation of  i;j;t+1 in the former. The certain or predictable component
of the SEHRR is therefore equivalent to the EHRR, and the SEHRR is dened
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as EHRR plus the uncertainty  i;j;t+1 under the assumption of separability
between the two components.
A similar treatment holds for the SEHCR. Let ri;j;t be the paid interest
rate of the j-th liability of the i-th nancial rm in period t. Then, rQi;j;t,
hIi;j;t, h
S
i;j;t, r
D
i;t, i;j;t, and h
R
i;j;t are the certain or predictable components
of the unpaid interest rate, the insurance premium rate, the service charge
rate, the subjective rate of time preference, the required reserve ratio, and
the SEHCR (hRi;j;t = ri;j;t + r
Q
i;j;t + h
I
i;j;t + r
D
i;t  i;j;t   hSi;j;t). Let Qj;t be the
total liabilities in the market, and let  i;j;t+1 be the sum of the uncertain or
unpredictable components of rQi;j;t, h
I
i;j;t, and  hSi;j;t. Furthermore, let zki;j;t
(k = R;Q; I; S) be the vectors of exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting each
component of the SEHCR, and let zHi;j;t =

zR0i;j;t; z
Q0
i;j;t; z
I0
i;j;t; z
S0
i;j;t; r
D
i;t; i;j;t
0
be the vectors of exogenous (state) variables of the SEHCR except  i;j;t+1,
where rDi;t and i;j;t are assumed to be exogenous similar to the denition in
the CURM. To ensure tractability of analysis, it is also assumed that hRi;j;t and
 i;j;t+1 are separable. The SEHCR, hi;j;t+1, can then be dened as follows.
Denition 3 The stochastic endogenous holding-cost rate of the j-th nan-
cial good of the i-th rm at the end of period t, denoted by hi;j;t+1, is dened
as
hi;j;t+1 = h
R
i;j;t +  i;j;t+1
= ri;j;t + r
Q
i;j;t + h
I
i;j;t + r
D
i;t  i;j;t   hSi;j;t +  i;j;t+1
= ri;j
 
Qj;t; z
R
i;j;t

+ rQi;j

Qj;t; z
Q
i;j;t

+ hIi;j
 
Qj;t; z
I
i;j;t

+ rDi;t  i;j;t
 hSi;j
 
Qj;t; z
S
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
= hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
= hi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t;  i;j;t+1

; j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL, (3)
where rDi;t  i;j;t is the implicit tax rate imposed by the reserve requirement
similar to the UCM and the CURM.
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The reserve requirement is a tax because it requires banks to hold deposits
that do not bear interest. The tax is the foregone interest on uninvested
required reserves. Similar to the di¤erence between the SEHRR and the
EHRR, the di¤erence between the SEHCR and the EHCR in the CURM is
the inclusion of  i;j;t+1 in the former. If all components of the EHCR are
certain or predictable, the SEHCR is simply the EHCR with  i;j;t+1 included
under the assumption of separability between the EHCR and  i;j;t+1.
2.2 Production Technology and Variable Cost Func-
tions
To represent the production technology of nancial rms as in the CURM,
the vector of real balances of nancial goods of the i-th nancial rm in
period t is dened as qi;t = (qi;1;t;   ; qi;NA+NL;t)0, and the vector of real
resource inputs, such as labor, materials, and physical capital, is given by
xi;t = (xi;1;t;   ; xi;M;t)0. The vector of exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting
the quality of nancial goods is dened as zQi;t =

zQ0i;1;t;   ; zQ0i;NA+NL;t
0
, and
the index of (exogenous) technical change is expressed by the variable  i;t.
In this case, the e¢ cient production technology can be dened as follows.5
Denition 4 The e¢ cient production technology of the i-th nancial rm
in period t is represented by the following transformation function:
i

qi;t;xi;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= 0: (4)
As described in Section 2.1, zQi;j;t (j = 1;   ; NA+NL), components of zQi;t,
are exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting the uncollected or unpaid interest
rates, the amount of which is interpreted as one measure of the quality of the
SEHRR or the SEHCR. This vector thus represents nancing technological
factors. As seen in the derivatives, nancing technological factors a¤ect not
5Under the assumption that the process of adjustment is essentially instantaneous, the
level of assets a bank chooses on day t does not depend on the level it chose on day t 1. In
other words, there are no portfolio adjustment costs. However, at present, several banks
wish they had the opportunity to divest themselves of some mortgage securities. Thus,
the introduction of portfolio adjustment costs is an important task for the future.
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only the SEHRR and the SEHCR but also the real resource inputs (i.e.,
labor, materials, and physical capital) through rQi;j;t. For this reason, z
Q
i;t is a
variable of the transformation function i.
As emphasized in the CURM, some elements of the real balance vector
qi;t may be outputs or inputs, but not all can be inputs, as the existence of
outputs cannot otherwise be guaranteed. Moreover, the transformation func-
tion i must satisfy appropriate regularity conditions. That is, i is strictly
convex in (qi;t;xi;t) and @i /@qi;j;t > 0 if qi;j;t is an output, @i /@qi;j;t < 0
if qi;j;t is an input, and @i /@xi;j;t < 0, because xi;t is an input vector.
As the times required for the adjustment of real resource inputs to op-
timized levels can vary among rms and industries, the vector of real re-
source inputs xi;t is divided into vectors of real resource variable inputs
xVi;t =
 
xVi;1;t;   ; xVi;MV ;t
0
, which include labor and materials, and real re-
source xed inputs xFi;t =
 
xFi;1;t;   ; xFi;MF ;t
0
, which include physical and
human capital. Real resource variable inputs are optimized within a single
period, taking outputs (nancial goods) and xed inputs (nancial goods and
real resource xed inputs) as given. The optimization of real resource xed in-
puts therefore requires several periods, similar to the case for nancial goods.
As a consequence, the optimization of real resource variable inputs must be
completed before the optimization of real resource xed inputs. To deal with
this requirement explicitly, it is assumed for a single period that the nan-
cial rm takes the vector of variable input prices pVi;t =
 
pVi;1;t;   ; pVi;MV ;t
0
as
given and minimizes real resource variable costs
XMV
j=1
pVi;j;t xVi;j;t with respect
to the vector of real resource variable inputs xVi;t subject to the transforma-
tion function i given by Eq. (4). This assumption leads to the following
denition of variable cost function.
Denition 5 The variable cost function of the i-th nancial rm in period
t, denoted by CVi

pVi;t;qi;t;x
F
i;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

, is given by
CVi

pVi;t;qi;t;x
F
i;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

= min
xVi;t
nXMV
j=1
pVi;j;t  xVi;j;t
i qi;t;xi;t; zQi;t;  i;t = 0o :
(5)
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In the transformation function (4), as mentioned above, it is important
that not all of the components of the real balance vector qi;t be inputs. In
the case of the variable cost function (5), elements of the real balance vector
qi;t may be outputs or xed inputs, but not all can be xed inputs.
As in the CURM, let qOi;t =
 
qOi;1;t;   ; qOi;NO;t
0
denote the output vec-
tor of real balances of the i-th nancial rm in period t, and let qFi;t = 
qFi;1;t;   ; qFi;NF ;t
0
be the xed input vector. Both vectors include all ele-
ments of qi;t.6 Due to the duality between transformation functions and
variable cost functions, the variable cost function CVi is strictly increasing
in pVi;t and q
O
i;t, strictly decreasing in x
F
i;t and q
F
i;t, and homogeneous of de-
gree one and strictly concave in pVi;t. In addition to these conditions, it is
assumed that CVi is twice continuously di¤erentiable in all its arguments and
strictly convex in qi;t and xFi;t . These assumptions become necessary when
the dynamically uncertain behavior of nancial rms is considered.
In the nancial industry, the scale of real resource xed inputs such as
physical capital is smaller than in the manufacturing industry, and the times
needed to adjust these inputs are shorter. For this reason, as in the CURM,
it is assumed that gross investment achieves instantaneous productivity and
the adjustment cost associated with installing capital is zero. Let Ii;j;t denote
gross investment, and let i;j;t be the depreciation rate, which is dened as a
constant and assumed to be given. Capital accumulation can then be dened
as follows.
Denition 6 Capital accumulation of the j-th real resource xed input of
the i-th nancial rm at time t, denoted by xFi;j;t, is given by
xFi;j;t = Ii;j;t + (1  i;j;t)  xFi;j;t 1; j = 1;   ;MF . (6)
2.3 Quasi Short-Run Prots, Equity Capital, and Util-
ity Functions
As in the CURM, the prots of a nancial rm are dened as the net cash ow
generated by employing or issuing nancial goods, minus the real resource
6In this case, qt =
 
qV 0t ;q
F 0
t
0
and NO +NF = NA +NL are satised.
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costs given by the sum of real resource variable and xed costs. This result
gives the quasi short-run prot, which di¤ers from the usual short-run
prot of a static model in that revenues from nancial goods are not expressed
by the sum of the product of an output and its price, and xed costs for
nancial goods are not represented by the sum of the product of a xed
input and its price. The present quasi short-run prot also di¤ers from that
dened in the CURM in that the new denition includes the components of
uncertainty in the SEHRR and the SEHCR, upon which the quasi short-run
prot is based.
Denition 7 The quasi short-run prot of the i-th nancial rm during
period t, denoted by QSi;t , is dened as follows:
QSi;t =
XNA+NL
j=1
qNCFi;j;t   CVi

pVi;t;qi;t;x
F
i;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

 
XMF
j=1
pFi;j;t  Ii;j;t
=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

1 + hi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zHi;j;t 1;  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t
 CVi

pVi;t;qi;t;x
F
i;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

 
XMF
j=1
pFi;j;t 

xFi;j;t   (1  i;j;t)  xFi;j;t 1

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zHi;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t
 CVi

pVi;t;qi;t;x
F
i;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

 
XMF
j=1
pFi;j;t 

xFi;j;t   (1  i;j;t)  xFi;j;t 1

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t 1; zHi;j;t 1
	  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t
 CVi

pVi;t;qi;t;x
F
i;t; z
Q
i;t;  i;t

 
XMF
j=1
pFi;j;t 

xFi;j;t   (1  i;j;t)  xFi;j;t 1

+pG;t 1 
XNA+NL
j=1
bj  qi;j;t 1   i;j;t, (7)
where pFi;j;t (j = 1;   ;MF ) are the prices of real resource xed inputs.
The rst term of the right-hand side of the last equality (showing the
sum of net cash ows) represents the total net revenue of nancial goods.
The second term denotes the variable cost of real resource variable inputs
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such as labor and materials, the third term represents the total expenditure
on investments, and the last term consists of the uncertain or unpredictable
components of the SEHRR and the SEHCR. As described in Section 2.1,
following the interpretation that the certain or predictable components of
the SEHRR and the SEHCR are equivalent to the EHRR and the EHCR,
the rst through third terms on the right-hand side correspond to the quasi
short-run prot in the CURM, and the fourth term is the di¤erence from the
CURM denition.
Financial rms such as banks are characteristically confronted with vari-
ous risks. Pyle (1997) dened these risks as reductions in rm value due to
changes in the business environment. Based on this denition, in the case
of banks, these risks were categorized into market risk, credit risk, opera-
tional risk, and performance risk. Market risk is the change in net asset
value due to changes in underlying economic factors such as interest rates,
exchange rates, and equity and commodity prices. Credit risk is the change
in net asset value due to changes in the perceived ability of counter-parties
to meet their contractual obligations. Operational risk results from costs in-
curred through mistakes made in carrying out transactions such as settlement
failures, failures to meet regulatory requirements, and untimely collections.
Performance risk encompasses losses resulting from the failure to properly
monitor employees or use appropriate methods (including "model risk").
If these risks are realized, nancial rms su¤er losses in loans and other
assets, in the worst case leading to bankruptcy. In this situation, equity
capital plays a role as a cushion against losses, and hence acts as protection
against nancial distress. According to Berger et al. (1995), nancial distress
occurs when the nancial rm is expected to have di¢ culty honoring its com-
mitments. Financial distress costs therefore include the costs of bankruptcy
such as the costs of transferring ownership of the rm from shareholders to
creditors, and any loss in value that may occur as a result of the perception
that bankruptcy may be imminent, even if bankruptcy may ultimately be
avoided. The latter may result from the loss of talented employees, demands
for more timely payments by suppliers, declines in revenues from credit-risk-
sensitive products such as long-term swaps and guarantees, and potentially
13
suboptimal operating, investment, and nancing decisions due to conicts of
interest between shareholders and creditors.
An increase in equity capital reduces the risk of the burden of nan-
cial distress costs, and also reduces the funding costs that may arise due
to declining funding rates, provided that creditors are lead to believe that
the risk of their assets is low. However, the preservation of equity capital
also has disadvantages, such as higher opportunity costs, transaction costs,
and agency costs, and lower earnings prospects. Opportunity costs represent
the increase in quasi short-run prots over that acquired in the absence of
equity capital. Transactions costs for equity capital are higher than those
for debt. For example, the costs of issuing equity are higher than those for
issuing a bond or debt. Higher agency costs arise due to conicts of in-
terest between shareholders and managers by reducing managersincentives
to work harder, resulting in poorer expense preference behavior and invest-
ment decision making. Finally, the earnings prospects of nancial markets
decrease with increasing equity capital, putting downward pressure on the
stock price of the nancial rm. Nevertheless, despite these disadvantages,
many nancial rms consider the advantages of equity capital to be worth
pursuing.
Considering the importance attached to equity capital by real nancial
rms, the utility function dened to deal explicitly with the attitude of -
nancial rms to risk is assumed to depend on not only the quasi short-run
prot (QSi;t , Eq. (7)), but also the equity capital qe;i;t, which is dened as
follows.7 ;8
Denition 8 The utility function of the i-th nancial rm during period t
7Although the utility function indirectly accounts for distress possibility, without an
explicitly specied model for bankruptcy, it may be di¢ cult to make any relevant inference
about distress costs. The introduction of this model is an important task for the future.
8Although the utility function is not a widely used tool for modeling rm behavior in
nance literature, circumstances may arise in which a rm may act in a risk-averse or
risk-loving manner. For example, when a rm has a positive net worth (capital) and there
are costs of nancial distress, the rm may act in a risk-averse manner. However, when
the net worth of the rm is negative, the rm may act in a risk-loving manner. In this
case, the rm could gamble (risk-shift) in order to increase the likelihood that the rm
will regain positive net worth before being shut down by regulators.
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is dened as
ui

QSi;t ; qe;i;t

, (8)
where
qe;i;t =
NAX
j=1
pG;t  qi;j;t +
MFX
j=1
pFi;j;t  xFi;j;t  
NA+NLX
j=NA+1
pG;t  qi;j;t. (9)
The accounting denition of equity capital is the total asset value minus
the total liability value. As in the usual utility function, it is assumed that
the utility function is strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable,
and strictly concave in QSi;t and qe;i;t.
3 Derivation of Generalized User-Revenue Prices
and Extension of Generalized Lerner In-
dices
The CURM was extended to include uncertainties with respect to the EHRR
and the EHCR, giving the SEHRR and the SEHCR and a new formulation of
the utility function of nancial rms that accounts for both quasi short-run
prots and equity capital. The inclusion of uncertainty through denition
of the SEHRR and the SEHCR introduces risk-adjustment e¤ects into the
CURM. These e¤ects are expressed as the covariance of uncertain factors in
the SEHRR or the SEHCR, according to a stochastic discount factor, and
allow the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots to be considered explicitly.
The redenition of the utility function introduces equity capital e¤ects, which
are expressed as the marginal rate of substitution between equity capital and
quasi short-run prots. The new utility function thus makes it possible to
indirectly evaluate the risk of bearing the cost of nancial distress, as well as
the opportunity costs of equity capital. In this section, these extensions are
discussed in detail, the SURP and the CURP are extended to the GURP, and
the GLI is extended to the EGLI. These additional modications e¤ectively
incorporate the relevant risks into the proposed GURM.
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The decision of nancial rms is formulated here as a stochastic dynamic
program, and stochastic Euler equations are transformed into a form that
expresses risk corrections explicitly. The GURP is also derived, capital e¤ects
and risk-adjustment e¤ects are dened, and relationship between the GURP
and the CURP is claried. Based on this relationship, the EGLI is derived
and the relationship between the EGLI and the GLI is shown.
3.1 Dynamic-Uncertainty Behavior and Stochastic Euler
Equations
The formulation of the decisions of a nancial rm as a stochastic dynamic
programming (SDP) problem is derived from the same considerations as in
the CURM. Two specications of the problem exist, for which the primary
di¤erence is in the relative timing of decision-making periods and the realiza-
tion of uncertainty. In the rst specication, the decision is made after the
uncertainty is realized, such that in each period the decision maker chooses
the state variable of the next period directly. In the second specication, the
decision is made before the uncertainty is realized, in which case the decision
maker chooses the control variable of the current period, and the state vari-
able of the next period then becomes a function of the chosen control variable
and the state variable of the current period. The adjustment cost of stock
variables is assumed to be zero, as described in Section 2, and more reliable
information on the decision leads to a rise in rm value. The rst specica-
tion is therefore assumed to be similar to that in the original CURM, that
is, the nancial rm chooses the state variable of the next period directly.
In the case of SDP, the state variables are classied as endogenous and
exogenous state variables. As in the CURM, the endogenous state variable
vectors yi;t (t  0) are the vectors of real balances of nancial goods qi;t, and
the vectors of real resource xed inputs xFi;t, that is,
yi;t =
 
q0i;t;x
F 0
i;t
0
=
 
qi;1;t;   ; qi;NA+NL;t; xFi;1;t;   ; xFi;MF ;t
0
(t  0) .
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The exogenous state variable vectors zi;t (t  0), are similarly dened as
zi;t =
 
zH0i;t 1; 
0
i;t; pG;t;p
V 0
i;t ;  i;t;p
F 0
i;t ; 
0
i;t
0
(t  0) ,
where zHi;t 1 =
 
zH0i;1;t 1;   ; zH0i;NA+NL;t 1
0
(t  0) are the exogenous variable
vectors, which consist of the certain or predictable components of the SEHRR
and the SEHCR in the period t   1 (  1). At t = 0, zHi; 1 = zHi;0 = 
zH0i;1;0;   ; zH0i;NA+NL;0
0
. As described in Section 2.1, zHi;j;t 1 (j = 1;   ; NA +
NL), the components of zHi;t 1, are given by
zHi;j;t 1 =

zR0i;j;t 1; z
Q0
i;j;t 1; z
S0
i;j;t 1; h
C
i;j;t 1; z
D0
i;j;t 1
0
(j = 1;   ; NA)
for nancial assets, and
zHi;j;t 1 =

zR0i;j;t 1; z
Q0
i;j;t 1; z
I0
i;j;t 1; z
S0
i;j;t 1; r
D
i;t 1; i;j;t 1
0
(j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL)
for liabilities. In the equation for zi;t, i;t =
 
 i;1;t;   ;  i;NA+NL;t
0
(t  0) are
vectors of the uncertain or unpredictable components of the SEHRR and the
SEHCR, and pG;t (t  0) are the general price indices. As described in Section
2.2, pVi;t =
 
pVi;1;t;   ; pVi;MV ;t
0
(t  0) are the vectors of variable input prices,
and  i;t (t  0) are the indices of exogenous technical change. In addition,
pFi;t =
 
pFi;1;t;   ; pFi;MF ;t
0
(t  0) are the vectors of xed input prices, and
i;t = (i;1;t;   ; i;MF ;t)0 (t  0) are the vectors of depreciation rates. Among
these exogenous state variables, the vectors of the exogenous state variables
with respect to the variable cost function are dened as zCi;t =

pV 0i;t ; z
Q0
i;t ;  i;t
0
(t  0), where zQi;t =

zQ0i;1;t;   ; zQ0i;NA+NL;t
0
(t  0) are the corresponding
vectors that a¤ect the quality of nancial goods. The vectors with respect
to the quasi short-run prot in period t ( 0) are dened as
zi;t =
 
zH0i;t 1; 
0
i;t; pG;t 1; pG;t; z
C0
i;t ;p
F 0
i;t ; 
0
i;t
0
(t  0) ,
and in the case of t = 0, zi;0 =
 
zH0i;0; 
0
i;0; pG;0;p
V 0
i;0;  i;0;p
F 0
i;0; 
0
i;0
0
. The vectors
with respect to equity capital are dened as zei;t =
 
pG;t;p
F 0
i;t
0
(t  0).
As in the CURM, in considering the uncertainties faced by the nancial
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rm, it is assumed that the stochastic process fzi;tgt0 follows a stationary
Markov process. Let (Z;BZ) be a measurable space, where Z is a set of zi;t,
and BZ is a -algebra of its subsets. In this case, the stochastic properties
of the exogenous state variables can be expressed as a stationary transition
function: Q : Z BZ ! [0; 1].9 The interpretation of this denition is that
Q (zi;t; Ai;t+1) is the probability that the state of the next period lies in the
set Ai;t+1, given that the current state is zi;t. The product space of (Z;BZ)
is expressed as
 
Zt;BtZ

= (Z      Z;BZ     BZ), and zi;0 (2 Z) is
given.
Denition 9 The probability measures on (Z;BZ), t (zi;0;  ) : BtZ ! [0; 1]
(t  1), are dened as follows.10 For any rectangle Ati = Ai;1Ai;t 2 BtZ:
t
 
zi;0; A
t
i

=
Z
Ai;1

Z
Ai;t 1
Z
Ai;t
Q (zi;t 1;dzi;t)Q (zi;t 2;dzi;t 1)Q (zi;0;dzi;1) .
(10)
The probability measure t (zi;0;  ) satises the properties of measures
and t (zi;0; Zt) = 1.
As described in the CURM, the decision to be carried out in period t
can depend upon the information that will be available at that time. This
information can be expressed as a sequence of vectors of the exogenous state
variables. Let zti = (zi;1;   ; zi;t) (2 Zt) denote the partial history in periods
1 through t, and let (Y;BY ) be a measurable space, where Y is a set of vectors
of the endogenous state variables yi;t, and BY is a -algebra of its subsets.
A plan ypi is then dened as the set of a value y
p
i;0 (2 Y ) and a sequence of
functions ypi;t : Z
t ! Y (t  1), where ypi;t (zti) =
 
qpi;t (z
t
i)
0
;xpF;i;t (z
t
i)
00 is the
value of yi;t+1 =
 
q0i;t+1;x
F 0
i;t+1
0
that will be chosen in period t if the partial
history of the exogenous state variables in periods 1 through t is zti.
In the remainder of the present paper, as in the CURM, the nancial
rm is assumed to choose a plan that maximizes the expected value of the
9For further details of the stationary transition function, see Stokey and Lucas (1989:
p.212).
10For a full account of the probability measures, see Stokey and Lucas (1989: pp.220
225).
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discounted intertemporal utility of its prots stream. The intertemporal
utility function is also assumed to be additively separable. In this case, the
optimization problem of the i-th nancial rm is given by
max
ypi
ui
h
QSi
 
yi;0;y
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

; qpe;i
 
ypi;0 (zi;0) ; z
e
i;0
i
+ lim
T!1
XT
t=1
Z
Zt
ti  ui
h
QSi
 
ypi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;ypi;t
 
zti

; zi;t

; qpe;i
 
ypi;t
 
zti

; zei;t
i
t
 
zi;0;dz
t
i

,
(11)
where ti =
Yt 1
s=0
i;s =
Yt 1
s=0
1
1 + rDi;s
is the cumulative discount factor and
rDi;s is the subjective rate of time preference.
11 Here, QSi
 
yi;0;y
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

and QSi
 
ypi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;ypi;t (z
t
i) ; z

i;t

(t  1) are the planned quasi short-run
prots, which are dened by Eq. (7) as follows:
QSi
 
ypi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;ypi;t
 
zti

; zi;t

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qpj;t 1; z
H
i;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qpi;j;t 1  zt 1i   pG;t  qpi;j;t  zti
 CVi
 
ypi;t
 
zti

; zCi;t
 XMF
j=1
pFi;j;t

xpF;i;j;t
 
zti
  (1  i;j;t)  xpF;i;j;t 1  zt 1i  (t  1),
(12)
QSi
 
yi;0;y
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;0; z
H
i;j;0

+  i;j;0
	  pG;0  qi;j;0   pG;0  qpi;j;0 (zi;0)
  CVi
 
ypi;0 (zi;0) ; z
C
i;0
 XMF
j=1
pFi;j;0 

xpF;i;j;0 (zi;0)  (1  i;j;0)  xFi;j;0

.
(13)
In addition, qpe;i
 
ypi;t (z
t
i) ; z
e
i;t

(t  0) are the planned equity capital, which,
11For details of this optimization problem, see Stokey and Lucas (1989: pp.241254).
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based on Eq. (9), is given by
qpe;i
 
ypi;t
 
zti

; zei;t

=
NAX
j=1
pG;tqpi;j;t
 
zti

+
MFX
j=1
pFi;j;txpF;i;j;t
 
zti
 NA+NLX
j=NA+1
pG;tqpi;j;t
 
zti

(t  0).
(14)
As described in the CURM, the necessary conditions for stochastic opti-
mization problems in sequence form can be found by adopting a variational
approach. Such conditions are represented by stochastic Euler equations,
which for the above optimization problem (11) are expressed as
  @u

i;t
@QSi;t

 
bj  pG;t +
@CV i;t
@qpi;j;t
!
+ bj  pG;t 
@ui;t
@qpe;i;t
+i;tbjpG;t
Z
Z
(
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t +
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
!
+  i;j;t+1
)
@u

i;t+1
@QSi;t+1
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (15)
  @u

i;t
@QSi;t

 
pFi;j;t +
@CV i;t
@xpF;i;j;t
!
+ pFi;j;t 
@ui;t
@qpe;i;t
+ i;t 
Z
Z
pFi;j;t+1  (1  i;j;t+1) 
@ui;t+1
@QSi;t+1
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0;
j = 1;   ;MF , (16)
where QSi;t = 
QS
i
 
ypi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;ypi;t (z
t
i) ; z

i;t

, qpe;i;t = q
p
e;i
 
ypi;t (z
t
i) ; z
e
i;t

, ui;t =
ui

QSi;t ; q
p
e;i;t

, CV i;t = C
V
i
 
ypi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

, and hRi;j;t = h
R
i;j
 
Qpj;t; z
H
i;j;t

.
As described in Section 2.1, bj is used to distinguish between nancial
assets and liabilities, and bC is used to distinguish cash from other nancial
assets. In the above equations, qpi;j;t = q
p
i;j;t (z
t
i) (j = 1;   ; NA +NL) denote
the optimal levels for nancial goods, xpF;i;j;t = x
p
F;i;j;t (z
t
i) (j = 1; ;MF ) rep-
resent the optimal levels for real resource xed inputs, and ypi;t = y
p
i;t (z
t
i) = 
qpi;t (z
t
i)
0
;xpF;i;t (z
t
i)
00 are the optimal levels for the endogenous state vari-
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ables.
As in the CURM, if the utility function ui;t is concave and continuously
di¤erentiable in ypi;t 1 =
 
qp0i;t 1;x
p0
F;i;t 1
0
and ypi;t and is integrable
12, then if
each of the partial derivatives of ui;t with respect to y
p
i;t 1 are absolutely inte-
grable13, the stochastic Euler equations (15) and (16) with the transversality
conditions
lim
t!1
ti 
Z
Z
@ui;t+1
@QSi;t+1
 @
QS
i;t+1
@ypi;j;t
ypi;j;tQ (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1;   ; NA+NL+MF ,
(17)
are su¢ cient conditions for an optimal plan ypi =
n
qpi;0;x
p
F;i;0;

qpi;t;x
p
F;i;t
	1
t=1
o
,
where ypi;j;t means q
p
i;j;t or x
p
F;i;j;t.
The di¤erence between Eq. (15) and the stochastic Euler equations con-
cerning nancial goods in the CURM is the inclusion of term expressing the
marginal utility of equity capital (bj  pG;t  @ui;t

@qpe;i;t ) and the uncertain
components of the SEHRR and the SEHCR ( i;j;t+1; j = 1;   ; NA + NL)
in Eq. (15). The extensions are simply additions to the stochastic Euler
equations in the original CURM and allow the e¤ects of equity capital and
uncertainties in the SEHRR and the SEHCR to be considered explicitly.
3.2 Risk Corrections
The inuence of uncertainties in the SEHRR and the SEHCR is resolved
explicitly by transforming Eq. (15) into the form of an expression of risk
correction. This is similar to the treatment in the CCAPM.
Theorem 1 Under the assumption that @ui;t
.
@QSi;t 6= 0 and E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t =
0, Eq. (15) can be transformed into the form of an expression of risk correc-
12The integrability of ui;t means
R
Z
ui;tQ (zi;t 1;dzi;t) <1.
13The absolute integrability of
@ui;t
@ypi;j;t 1
is dened as
R
Z
 @ui;t@ypi;j;t 1  Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) <1.
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tion as follows:
  bj  pG;t  MCV i;j;t + bj  pG;t MRSe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
	  E IMRS;i;t+1 jzi;t 
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
= 0;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (18)
where MCV i;j;t = @C
V 
i;t

@qpi;j;t , MRS

e;i;t =
 
@ui;t

@qpe;i;t
.
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

14,
i;j;t = @h
R
i;j;t

@ ln qpi;j;t , IMRS

;i;t+1 =

@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
.
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

15,
and E [  jzi;t ] =
R
Z
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1).
14This term is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of quasi short-run prots for
equity capital. This MRS is a measure of the rate at which the nancial rm is just willing
to substitute quasi short-run prots for equity capital, or in other words, a measure of the
opportunity costs of equity capital.
15This term represents the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) with
respect to quasi short-run prots, and is a measure of the rate at which the nancial rm
is just willing to substitute quasi short-run prots in period t for prots in period t + 1.
In the case that the nancial rm is risk-averse, the marginal utility of quasi short-run
prots is a decreasing function of quasi short-run prots. The IMRS therefore declines
if quasi short-run prots increase from the current period to the next period and rises if
prots decrease.
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Proof. Both sides of Eq. (15) are divided by @ui;t
.
@QSi;t , provided
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t 6= 0, which gives
  bj  pG;t  
@CV i;t
@qpi;j;t
+ bj  pG;t 
@ui;t

@qpe;i;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
Z
Z
(
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t +
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
!
+  i;j;t+1
)

@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (19)
To simplify the expressions, the notation of Theorem 1 is used. Equation
(19) can then be rewritten as
  bj  pG;t  MC V i;j;t + bj  pG;t MRSe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t  E

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  IMRS ;i;t+1 jzi;t  = 0;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (20)
To transform these equations into a form in which risk corrections are ex-
pressed explicitly, the expectation in the third term of the left-hand side of
Eq. (20) is transformed by the same method as employed in the CCAPM. Let
wi;j;t+1 = 1+ bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1. The expectation in the third term is
then expressed as E

wi;j;t+1  IMRS ;i;t+1
 zi;t. As in the CCAPM, the co-
variance of wi;j;t+1 with respect to IMRS

;i;t+1, cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS

;i;t+1
 zi;t,
is the focus of attention. Using the property of covariance
cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS

;i;t+1
 zi;t = E wi;j;t+1  IMRS ;i;t+1 zi;t
 E wi;j;t+1 zi;t  E IMRS ;i;t+1 zi;t ,
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E

wi;j;t+1  IMRS ;i;t+1
 zi;t can be written as
E

wi;j;t+1  IMRS ;i;t+1
 zi;t = E wi;j;t+1 zi;t  E IMRS ;i;t+1 zi;t
+cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS

;i;t+1
 zi;t . (21)
Substituting wi;j;t+1 = 1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1 for E

wi;j;t+1
 zi;t,
under the assumption that E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t = 0, leads to
E

wi;j;t+1
 zi;t = 1 + bC   hRi;j;t + i;j;t . (22)
Substituting wi;j;t+1 = 1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1 and IMRS

;i;t+1 =
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
.
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

for cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS

;i;t+1
 zi;t, the prop-
erty of covariance gives the following:
cov
 
wi;j;t+1; IMRS

;i;t+1
 zi;t = cov   i;j;t+1; IMRS ;i;t+1 zi;t
=
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
.(23)
Substituting Eqs. (22) and (23) for Eq. (21), the expectation in the third
term of the left-hand side of Eq. (20) can be transformed into a form ex-
pressing risk corrections explicitly, as follows:
E

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  IMRS ;i;t+1 jzi;t 
=

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
	  E IMRS ;i;t+1 jzi;t 
+
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
. (24)
Substituting Eq. (24) into Eq. (20) thus adds a risk-adjustment term, as
given by Eq. (18).
The second term of the right-hand side of Eq. (24),
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t.@ui;t.@QSi;t  , that is, the ratio of the
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covariance of uncertain components of the SEHRR and the SEHCR with
respect to the marginal utility of quasi short-run prots in period t + 1 to
the same marginal utility in period t, is a risk-adjustment term. In the
case that the risk attitude of nancial rms is averse, the marginal utility
of quasi short-run prots is a decreasing function of its prots. Therefore,
cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t is positive if cov i;j;t+1; @ui;t+1.@QSi;t+1  zi;t is neg-
ative, and vice versa. In this case, the variance of quasi short-run prots in
the next period increases if a nancial asset in the current period increases,
while the same variance decreases if a liability in the current period increases,
and vice versa. For example, if  (0 <  < 1) of the jth nancial good in
period t increases, then from Eq. (7), the quasi short-run prot in the next
period becomes QSi;t+1+bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	 pG;t . In this
case, its variance can be expressed as
var

QSi;t+1 + bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  pG;t   zi;t
= var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t+ 2  bj  pG;t    cov i;j;t+1; QSi;t+1 zi;t
+(bj  pG;t  )2  var
 
 i;j;t+1
 zi;t . (25)
Thus, if  is su¢ ciently small, then the third term of the right-hand side of
this equation is much smaller than the second term. The sign of the second
term, cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t, determines whether this variance is greater
than var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t. Thus, in the case that the j-th nancial good is a
nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1), the variance is greater than var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t if
the sign of cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t is positive. Similarly, in the case that the
j-th nancial good is a liability (i.e., bj =  1), this variance is greater than
var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t if the sign of cov i;j;t+1; QSi;t+1 zi;t is negative.
In the CCAPM, i;tIMRS ;i;t+1 and 1

E

i;t  IMRS ;i;t+1 jzi;t

are re-
garded as a stochastic discount factor and a risk-free rate. Using this risk-free
rate, the Eq. (18) can be expressed as the following corollary.
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Corollary 1 Equation (18) can be expressed as follows:
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MCV i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
=

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
	  Si;t + i;t  cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
=
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

R
F
i;t
+ i;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (26)
where Si;t = i;tIMRS;i;t+1, 
S
i;t = E

Si;t jzi;t

, and R
F
i;t = 1
.

S
i;t .
Proof. Divide Eq. (18) by bjpG;t and substituteE

i;t  IMRS ;i;t+1 jzi;t

=

S
i;t = 1
.
R
F
i;t into Eq. (18).
In the case that the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset, the left-hand
side of Eq. (26) can be interpreted as the net costs required to increase
the nancial asset in period t by one unit. These are referred to as the net
marginal costs, which include not only the money for one unit required to
increase the nancial asset by one unit, but also the change in real resource
variable costs (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t and an increase in utility associated with
an increase in equity capital based on the marginal utility of quasi short-run
prots. In the case that the j-th nancial good is a liability, the left-hand
side of Eq. (26) can be interpreted as the net funds obtained by increas-
ing the liability in period t by one unit. Similar to the net marginal costs,
these net marginal funds account for not only the money for one unit ob-
tained by increasing the liability by one unit, but also the change in real
resource variable costs (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t and a decrease in utility associ-
ated with a decrease in equity capital based on the marginal utility of quasi
short-run prots. As explained in Eq. (22), 1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

in the
rst term of the right-hand side of Eq. (26) represents the expectation of
wi;j;t+1 = 1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1, that is, E

wi;j;t+1 jzi;t

. wi;j;t+1
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is the net revenue obtained by employing the nancial asset of one unit if
the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1), and the total cost
repaid for the liability of one unit if the j-th nancial good is a liability (i.e.,
bj =  1).16 In both cases, as in the CCAPM, wi;j;t+1 is the payo¤. The rst
term of the right-hand side of the rst equality in Eq. (26) is the product
of these payo¤s and the stochastic discount factor, and that of the second
equality is the payo¤ discounted by the risk-free rate, or in other words, the
present discounted value of expected payo¤. The second term of the right-
hand side of Eq. (26) is the product of the risk-adjustment term and the
subjective discount factor. Similar to Eq. (23), this term corresponds to the
covariance of the payo¤s with stochastic discount factor cov
 
wi;j;t+1; 
S
i;t
 zi;t
(=cov
 
wi;j;t+1; i;t  IMRS ;i;t+1
 zi;t). Therefore, Eq. (26) expresses the net
marginal costs or funds as being equivalent to the sum of the present dis-
counted value of expected payo¤s and the covariance of the payo¤s with the
stochastic discount factor.
Under these denitions, if quasi short-run prots are constant or the
nancial rm is risk-neutral, then net marginal costs or funds are equiv-
alent to the present discounted value of expected payo¤s. If the nancial
rm is risk-averse and cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0, then the net marginal
costs or funds are smaller than the present discounted value of expected
payo¤s, because cov
 
wi;j;t+1; 
S
i;t
 zi;t < 0. If the nancial rm is risk-
averse and cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0, then the net marginal costs or funds
are greater than the present discounted value of expected payo¤s, because
cov
 
wi;j;t+1; 
S
i;t
 zi;t > 0. As shown by Eq. (25), if the j-th nancial good
is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1) and cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0, then
var

QSi;t+1 + bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qpj;t; z
H
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  pG;t   zi;t
> var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t .
16The sign of i;j;t is considered to be negative if the j-th nancial good is a nancial
asset (i.e., bj = 1) and is considered to be positive if a liability (i.e., bj =  1). Therefore,
wi;j;t+1 is the net revenue in the former case and is the total cost in the latter case.
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Hence, the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots increases because
cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t =cov i;j;t+1; QSi;t+1 zi;t. In this case, if the net
marginal costs do not decrease, then the nancial assets of the nancial rm
would not increase, resulting in a decrease in net marginal costs. Conversely,
if cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0, then the nancial assets of the nancial rm
would increase even if the marginal cost increases slightly, as an increase
in nancial assets reduces the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots and
thereby increases net marginal costs. On the other hand, if the j-th nancial
good is a liability (i.e., bj =  1) and cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0, then the
nancial rm would increase the liability even if the net marginal funds de-
crease slightly, since an increase in the liability reduces the volatility risk of
quasi short-run prots and thereby reduces net marginal funds. Conversely,
if cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0, then the nancial rm would not increase the
liability if the net marginal funds do not increase because an increase in the
liability increases the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots, which would
result in an increase in net marginal funds.
Corollary 2 Similarly to Theorem 1, provided that E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t = 0, Eq.
(26) can be expressed as follows:
E
h
Ri;j;t+1
 zi;ti = RFi;t  RFi;t  covRi;j;t+1; Si;t  zi;t
= R
F
i;t  
cov

Ri;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
E
h
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
 zi;ti ;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (27)
where
Ri;j;t+1 =
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MCV i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
.
Proof. As in the CCAPM, dividing both sides of Eq. (26) by
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
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and substituting
i;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
= cov
 
 i;j;t+1; 
S
i;t
 zi;t
leads to the following expression:
1 =
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
Si;t+
cov
 
 i;j;t+1; 
S
i;t
 zi;t
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (28)
For simplication, the following notation is used:
Ri;j;t+1 =
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
.
Similar to Theorem 1, provided that E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t = 0, the following equa-
tion holds:
E
h
Ri;j;t+1
 zi;ti = 1 + bC   hRi;j;t + i;j;t
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
.
In addition, using the property of covariance, the following equation applies:
cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
S
i;t
 zi;t = cov   i;j;t+1; Si;t  zi;t
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
.
In this case, Eq. (28) can be expressed as
1 = E
h
Ri;j;t+1
 zi;ti Si;t +covRi;j;t+1; Si;t  zi;t , j = 1;   ; NA+NL. (29)
Substituting 
S
i;t = 1
.
R
F
i;t into the above equation then yields Eq. (27).
In the case that the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset, Ri;j;t+1 is the
payo¤ of the nancial asset divided by the net marginal costs, corresponding
to the returns referred to in the CCAPM and referred to similarly in this case.
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In the case that the j-th nancial good is a liability, Ri;j;t+1 is the payo¤ of
the liability divided by the net marginal funds, representing repayments. In
Eq. (27), the expected returns or repayments are equivalent to the di¤erence
between the risk-free rate and the covariance of returns or repayments con-
sidering the marginal utility of quasi short-run prots in period t+1 divided
by the same marginal utility in period t.
In the case that the nancial rm is risk-averse, the sign of the sec-
ond term of the left-hand side of Eq. (27) is consistent with the sign of
cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t, since the marginal utility of quasi short-run prof-
its is a decreasing function of quasi short-run prots and is usually posi-
tive. The sign of cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t is also consistent with the sign
of cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t (=cov i;j;t+1; QSi;t+1 zi;t), because, based on the
property of covariance,
cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t = cov

wi;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
=
cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
holds and the sign of the denominator of the right-hand side of this equation
is usually positive. Consequently, if the nancial rm is risk-averse, the j-th
nancial good is a nancial asset (bj = 1), and cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0,
then the nancial rm would not increase the nancial asset if the expected
returns do not increase so as to avoid an increase in the volatility risk of quasi
short-run prots, resulting in an increase in expected returns. Conversely, if
cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0, then the nancial rm would increase the nan-
cial asset even if the expected return decreases slightly, since an increase in
the nancial asset reduces the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots. Thus,
the expected returns would decrease. If the nancial rm is risk-averse, the
j-th nancial good is a liability (bj =  1), and cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0,
then the nancial rm would increase the liability even if the expected repay-
ment increases slightly, as an increase in the liability reduces the volatility
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risk of quasi short-run prots, in which case the expected repayments would
increase. Conversely, if cov

Ri;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0, then the nancial rm
would not increase the liability if the expected repayments do not decrease
because an increase in the liability increases the volatility risk of quasi short-
run prots, resulting in a decrease in expected repayments. If quasi short-run
prots are constant or the nancial rm is risk-neutral, then the expected
returns or repayments are equivalent to the risk-free rate.
3.3 Equity Capital E¤ects, Risk-Adjustment E¤ects,
and Generalized User-Revenue Prices
Equation (18) represents a stochastic Euler equation with respect to nancial
goods, extended from that in the original CURM to incorporate consideration
of the e¤ects of equity capital and the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots.
By transforming these equations, the GURP is derived as an extension of the
SURP and the CURP.
Corollary 3 Equation (18) can be expressed as follows:
MCV i;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

+MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (30)
where rFi;t = R
F
i;t   1 and
$i;j;t = i;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
.
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Proof. Transformation of Eq. (18) with respect to MC V i;j;t and rearrange-
ment then gives
MC V i;j;t = bj  pG;t 
hn
bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
  1.Si;t   1o  Si;t +MRSe;i;t
+i;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
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= bjpG;t
hn
bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
  RFi;t   1o.RFi;t +MRSe;i;t +$i;j;ti
= bjpG;t

bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
  rFi;t 	 1 + rFi;t  +MRSe;i;t +$i;j;t
= bjpG;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

+MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL.
The right-hand side of this equation is then the price of the j-th nancial
good, i.e., is equivalent to MC V i;j;t. This is thus used as the denition for the
GURP.
Denition 10 The generalized user-revenue price of the i-th nancial rm
during period t, denoted by pGURi;j;t , is dened as
pGURi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

+MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (31)
From this denition and Corollary 3, the following remark follows imme-
diately.
Remark 1 From Corollary 3 and Denition 10,
MCV i;j;t = p
GUR
i;j;t ; j = 1;   ; NA +NL (32)
holds, and thus the classication of nancial goods into inputs and outputs
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based on the sign of each GURP is consistent with the classication based on
the sign of each partial derivative of the variable cost function with respect to
nancial goods. The sign of the partial derivative of the variable cost function
is the same as the sign of the GURP, indicating that a nancial good is an
output if positive and a xed input if negative.
As described in the CURM, i;j;t in the second term of the right-hand side
of Eq. (31) reects the e¤ects of the market structure of the j-th nancial
good and the strategic interdependence of nancial rms, as expressed by
i;j;t =
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
=
qpi;j;t
Qpj;t
 @h
R
i;j;t
@ lnQpj;t

 
1 +
XNF
k 6=i
@qpk;j;t
@qpi;j;t
!
= si;j;t  Qi;j;t 
 
1 + CV i;j;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (33)
where si;j;t (= q
p
i;j;t

Qpj;t ) is the ratio of the real balance of the j-th nancial
good of the i-th nancial rm to the total balance in the market for the j-th
nancial good. The range of si;j;t is 0 < s

i;j;t  1, and si;j;t = 1 if the i-th
nancial rm has a monopoly. Here, Qi;j;t (= @h
R
i;j;t

@ lnQpj;t ) is the elasticity
of the certain or predictable components of the SEHRR or the SEHCR for
the j-th nancial good with respect to the total balance in the market, and
represents the fractional change in the former due to a 1% increase in the
latter. From Eqs. (2) and (3), Qi;j;t can be expressed as
Qi;j;t =
@hRi;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
@ri;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
+
@rQi;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
+
@hSi;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
  @h
D
i;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
(j = 2;   ; NA) ,
@ri;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
+
@rQi;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
+
@hIi;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
  @h
S
i;j;t
@ lnQpj;t
(j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL) .
(34)
From these equations, if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset (other
than cash), that is, if j = 2;   ; NA, then the elasticity of the certain or
predictable components of the SEHRR with respect to the total balance in
the market corresponds to the sum of the same elasticities of the collected
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interest rate, the uncollected interest rate, and the service charge rate, minus
the same elasticity of the default rate. If the j-th nancial good is a liability,
then the elasticity of the certain or predictable components of the SEHCR
with respect to the total balance in the market corresponds to the sum of
the same elasticities of the paid interest rate, the unpaid interest rate, and
the insurance premium rate, minus the same elasticity of the service charge
rate. The sign of the elasticity of the certain or predictable component of
the collected interest rate with respect to the total balance in the market is
usually negative, and the sign of the same elasticity of the paid interest rate
is usually positive. However, the sign of the other elasticities can be both
positive or both negative.
The conjectural derivative CV i;j;t (=
PNF
k 6=i @q
p
k;j;t

@qpi;j;t ) describes how
the i-th nancial rm regards the changes in the j-th nancial good of other
rms with respect to the change in the j-th nancial good of the i-th nancial
rm in period t. As described in the CURM, if si;j;t = 1 and CV

i;j;t = 0,
then the i-th nancial rm has a monopoly in the j-th nancial good market
in period t. If CV i;j;t = 0, then the i-th nancial rm is a Cournot rm,
that is, the outputs of all other nancial rms are no expected to change as
the output of the i-th nancial rm changes. If CV i;j;t =  1, then the i-th
nancial rm is a competitive rm, that is, the price-marginal cost margin
is zero. Higher values of CV i;j;t correspond to larger gaps between price and
marginal cost, and thus represent less intense competition. The second term
of the right-hand side of Eq. (31), pG;t times i;j;t divided by 1 + r
F
i;t , thus
represents the market structure and conduct e¤ects.
As described in footnote 14, MRSe;i;t in the third term of the right-hand
side of Eq. (31) represents the marginal rate of substitution of quasi short-
run prots for equity capital. The parameter thus provides a measure of the
rate at which the nancial rm is willing to substitute quasi short-run prots
for equity capital as an index of the importance of equity capital, which
directly reects the nancial rms subjective evaluation of equity capital
and associated opportunity costs. As described in Section 2.3, in the case
that the nancial rm encounters nancial distress, equity capital acts as
a cushion against losses and reduces the burden of nancial distress costs.
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The MRSe;i;t parameter therefore indirectly reects the subjective value of
a decrease in the risk of bearing nancial distress costs through an increase
in equity capital. In other words, it provides a subjective evaluation of the
occurrence of the risk of bearing nancial distress costs due to a lack of
equity capital. From Eq. (14), equity capital in period t increases due to an
increase in a nancial asset or a decrease in a liability in period t. In this case,
quasi short-run prots in period t decrease. In the case that the nancial
rm is risk-averse, the marginal utility of equity capital in period t, given by
@ui;t

@qpe;i;t , is a decreasing function of equity capital. Similarly, the marginal
utility of quasi short-run prots in period t, given by @ui;t
.
@QSi;t , is also a
decreasing function of quasi short-run prots. Therefore, if equity capital in
period t is large, then the denominator ofMRSe;i;t is large and the numerator
is small, resulting in a small value for the MRSe;i;t. Therefore, in the case
that the nancial rm is risk-averse, if the equity capital is large, then the
risk of bearing nancial distress costs is small, and the subjective value of a
decrease in the risk of bearing nancial distress costs through an increase in
equity capital is also small. In this case, from Eq. (31), the GURP decreases
if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1) and increases if
the j-th nancial good is a liability (bj =  1). In the case of a nancial
asset, the third term of the right-hand side of Eq. (31), bj  pG;tMRSe;i;t,
is positive, as an increase in a nancial asset increases equity capital. In
the case of a liability, the term is negative because an increase in a liability
reduces equity capital. For a liability, contrary to the case for a nancial
asset, the risk of bearing nancial distress costs increases with a decrease in
equity capital, and this subject value is negative. Similar to the case for a
nancial asset, however, if the equity capital is large, then the risk of bearing
nancial distress costs is small, and the absolute value of this subjective value
is small. The third term of the right-hand side of Eq. (31) thus represents
equity capital e¤ects.
As described Section 3.2, the multiplicand
i;t  cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t.@ui;t.@QSi;t 
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in the fourth term of the right-hand side of Eq. (31), denoted $i;j;t for sim-
plicity, represents the e¤ects of the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots.
The sign of$i;j;t is determined by the sign of cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t,
because the sign of @ui;t
.
@QSi;t is usually positive. As the marginal utility
of quasi short-run prots is a decreasing function of quasi short-run prots if
the nancial rm is risk-averse, the sign of cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
is opposite that of cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t. The sign of $i;j;t is thus oppo-
site that of cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t. In this case, an increase in a nancial
asset reduces the variance of quasi short-run prots in period t + 1, that
is, reduces the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots if the j-th nancial
good is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1), and an increase in a liability increases
the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots if the j-th nancial good is a
liability (i.e., bj =  1). From Eq. (31), the GURP of the nancial asset
thus increases, while the GURP of the liability decreases.17 In the case that
the nancial rm is risk-averse, the nancial rm desires the volatility risk
of quasi short-run prots to decrease. In this scenario, the nancial goods
that when increased reduce the risk are rated high, while those that when
increased also increase the risk are rated low. The GURP of the former nan-
cial good should therefore increase, while that of the latter should decrease.
The fourth term of the right-hand side of Eq. (31), which is the product of
$i;j;t and pG;t, thus represents the risk-adjustment e¤ects.
As dened in the CURM, the SURP and the CURP are expressed as the
following denitions.
Denition 11 The stochastic user-revenue price of the i-th nancial rm
during period t, denoted by pSURi;j;t , is dened as
pSURi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (35)
17If the GURP is negative, i.e., the nancial good is a xed input, a positive value of
$i;j;t corresponds to a decrease in the absolute value of the GURP.
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Denition 12 The conjectural user-revenue price of the i-th nancial rm
during period t, denoted by pCURi;j;t , is dened as
pCURi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

= pSURi;j;t + bj  pG;t  bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (36)
Remark 2 Using the SURP or the CURP, the GURP can be then expressed
as
pGURi;j;t = p
SUR
i;j;t + bj  pG;t 

bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

+MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

= pCURi;j;t + bj  pG;t 

MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (37)
This equation shows that the GURP takes into account the SURP, as
well as market structure and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-
adjustment e¤ects. The GURP is therefore equivalent to the CURP with
the addition of equity capital e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects, that is,
the SURP is extended to include explicit consideration of market structure
and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment e¤ects. If
the equity capital e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects are zero, that is, if the
e¤ects cancel or are both zero, then the GURP is fully equivalent to the
CURP. If the market structure and conduct e¤ects are zero, then the GURP
is fully equivalent to the SURP. As described in the CURM, if the nancial
rm is risk-neutral, then the GURP corresponds to the UCP of the UCM.
3.4 Extended Generalized-Lerner Indices
The EGLI, an extension of the GLI in the CURM, can be derived using
Eqs. (30) and (32), which represent the relationship between the GURP and
marginal variable costs, and Eq. (37), which give the relationships among
the SURP, the CURP, and the GURP. In concrete terms, as in the CURM,
dividing the discrepancy between the SURP and the marginal variable costs
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by the SURP of Eq. (35) gives the EGLI. The SURP is a price in which mar-
ket structure and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment
e¤ects are zero. The discrepancy between the SURP and marginal variable
costs therefore takes these e¤ects into account. In this section, the case of a
positive SURP and positive marginal variable costs is considered with respect
to the j-th nancial good as an output.
Remark 3 From Eqs. (32) and (37), the discrepancy between the SURP
and marginal variable costs can be expressed as
pSURi;j;t  MCV i;j;t =  bj pG;t
 
i;j;t +MRS

e;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1; ; NA+NL, (38)
where
i;j;t = bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (39)
The EGLI is dened by dividing both sides of Eq. (38) by the SURP
given by Eq. (35).
Denition 13 The extended generalized-Lerner index of the j-th nancial
good of the i-th rm in period t, denoted by EGLIi;j;t, is dened as
EGLIi;j;t =
pSURi;j;t  MCV i;j;t
pSURi;j;t
=  bC  

i;j;t +
 
MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t
   1 + rFi;t 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (40)
Under the assumption that the j-th nancial good is an output, the sign
of bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t is positive if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset,
and negative if the j-th nancial good is a liability. If the sign of i;j;t is
determined by the sign of @ri;j;t

@ lnQpj;t , then the sign of 

i;j;t is negative if
the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset and positive if the j-th nancial
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good is a liability. The sign of MRSe;i;t + $

i;j;t can be both positive and
negative.
Remark 4 Even if i;j;t = 0, the SURP is greater than the marginal variable
costs if MRSe;i;t + $

i;j;t < 0 for nancial assets or MRS

e;i;t + $

i;j;t > 0 for
liabilities and thus the EGLI has a positive value.
The inequalityMRSe;i;t+$

i;j;t < 0 holds for nancial assets if the subjec-
tive value of an increase in the risk of bearing nancial distress costs due to
an increase in the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots is greater than the
subjective value of a decrease in the risk of bearing nancial distress costs
due to an increase in equity capital. Similarly, MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t > 0 applies
for liabilities if an increase in the liability increases the volatility risk of quasi
short-run prots, or even if the risk is reduced, the subject value of a decrease
in the risk of bearing nancial distress costs is smaller than the subject value
of an increase in the risk due to a decrease in equity capital. In these cases,
it is thus understood that the EGLI has a positive value even if the market
for the j-th nancial good is competitive, that is, i;j;t = 0.
Remark 5 Even if the market is uncompetitive, that is, i;j;t < 0 for nan-
cial assets and i;j;t > 0 for liabilities, then the degree by which the SURP ex-
ceeds the marginal variable costs is restrained, making the EGLI smaller than
the GLI. Here, MRSe;i;t+$

i;j;t > 0 and
 
MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t
 1 + rFi;t   i;j;t
for nancial assets, and MRSe;i;t+$

i;j;t < 0 and
 MRSe;i;t +$i;j;t   1 + rFi;t  
i;j;t for liabilities. In the case that 

i;j;t +
 
MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t
   1 + rFi;t  = 0,
the SURP is equivalent to the marginal variable costs and the EGLI is zero.
The inequalityMRSe;i;t+$

i;j;t > 0 holds for nancial assets if an increase
in the nancial asset reduces the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots, or
even if the risk increases, the subject value of an increase in the risk of
bearing nancial distress costs is smaller than the subject value of a decrease
in the risk due to an increase in equity capital. Similarly,MRSe;i;t+$

i;j;t < 0
applies for liabilities if the subjective value of a decrease in the risk of bearing
nancial distress costs due to a decrease in the volatility risk of quasi short-
run prots is greater than the subjective value of an increase in the risk of
39
bearing nancial distress costs due to a decrease in equity capital. In these
cases, it is understood that the EGLI is smaller than the GLI, or that the
EGLI is zero, even if the market for the j-th nancial good is uncompetitive.
As dened in the CURM, the GLI is dened as follows.
Denition 14 The generalized-Lerner index of the j-th nancial good of the
i-th rm in period t, denoted by GLIi;j;t, is dened as
GLIi;j;t =  
bC  i;j;t
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (41)
Remark 6 Using the GLI, the EGLI can be then expressed as
EGLIi;j;t = GLIi;j;t 
 
MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t
   1 + rFi;t 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
; j = 1; ; NA+NL. (42)
The EGLI thus represents an extension of the GLI to include considera-
tion of equity capital e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects in the discrepancy
between the SURP and marginal variable costs. If these e¤ects cancel or are
both zero, the EGLI is fully equivalent to the GLI.
4 Conclusion
In the present paper a generalized user-revenue model was constructed as an
extension of the conjectural user-revenue model. The proposed GURM takes
into account the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots and equity capital
e¤ects reecting the risk of bearing the costs of nancial distress. This ex-
tension was achieved by introducing the principles of the consumption-based
capital asset pricing model into the CURM proposed by Homma and Souma
(2005). Specically, uncertainties were added to the endogenous holding-
revenue and holding-cost rates, and the denition of the utility function of
nancial rms was extended to incorporate both quasi short-run prots and
equity capital. Risk-adjustment e¤ects were introduced by expressing the
covariance of uncertain factors in the stochastic endogenous holding-revenue
and holding-cost rates with a stochastic discount factor, allowing for explicit
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consideration of the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots. Equity capi-
tal e¤ects were introduced by expressing the marginal rate of substitution
between equity capital and quasi short-run prots, making it possible to
subjectively evaluate the accrual of equity capital by nancial rms consid-
ering both the opportunity costs and the risk of bearing the cost of nancial
distress. The stochastic and conjectural user-revenue prices were derived
as a generalized user-revenue price, and the extended generalized-Lerner in-
dex was proposed to incorporate these extensions. The modications of the
CURM allow the analysis to account for these risks.
The generalized user-revenue price adds explicit consideration of market
structure and conduct e¤ects and equity capital and risk-adjustment e¤ects
to the stochastic user-revenue price. The GURP is also an extension of the
conjectural user-revenue price to account explicitly for equity capital and
risk-adjustment e¤ects. If the sum of equity capital and risk-adjustment
e¤ects is zero, that is, either the two e¤ects cancel or both are zero, then the
GURP is exactly equivalent to the CURP. Similarly, if the sum of the market
structure and conduct e¤ects is zero, then the GURP is exactly equivalent
to the SURP. If the nancial rm is risk-neutral, then the GURP is also
equivalent to the user-cost price of the user-cost model. The extended GLI
incorporates consideration of the e¤ects of equity capital and risk adjustment
on the discrepancy between the SURP and marginal variable costs. Thus, if
both e¤ects are zero or cancel, then the EGLI is exactly equivalent to the
GLI.
The present denition of the EGLI claried two key points of particular
importance for industrial organization. First, even if the market for a -
nancial good is competitive, the SURP is greater than the marginal variable
costs, resulting in a positive EGLI value. In this case, for nancial assets,
the subjective value of an increase in the risk of bearing nancial distress
costs due to an increase in the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots is
greater than the subjective value of a decrease in the risk of bearing nancial
distress costs due to an increase in equity capital. For liabilities, an increase
in the liability increases the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots, or alter-
natively, even if the risk is reduced, the subjective value of a decrease in the
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risk of bearing nancial distress costs is smaller than the subjective value of
an increase in the risk due to a decrease in equity capital. Second, even if the
market for a nancial good is uncompetitive, the degree by which the SURP
exceeds the marginal variable costs is restrained. Thus, the EGLI is smaller
than the GLI, or if the SURP is equivalent to the marginal variable costs, the
EGLI is zero. In this case, for nancial assets, an increase in the nancial
asset reduces the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots, or alternatively,
even if the risk is increased, the subjective value of an increase in the risk
of bearing nancial distress costs is smaller than the subjective value of a
decrease in the risk due to an increase in equity capital. For liabilities, the
subjective value of a decrease in the risk of bearing nancial distress costs due
to a decrease in the volatility risk of quasi short-run prots is greater than
the subjective value of an increase in the risk of bearing nancial distress
costs due to a decrease in equity capital.
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